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2 Social Protests, Village Democracy 
and State Building in China: 
Introduction 
How Do Rural Social Protests 
Promote Village Democracy? 
Baogang He! 
Social protests are frequent occurrences in rural China. In facing rural 
unrest, disorder and instability, the government has adopted various 
strategies. The main one aims to contain collective actions through pro-
hibiting any unofficial national associations, punishing the organisers 
of collective actions, and disciplining local officials who are corrupt or 
incapable of controlling social protests. As a result, rural social protests 
and movements are not able to form a national political movement. 
They take place on a small scale - they are minor and mild, informal, 
isolated, sporadic, and dispersed. 
'The total suppression of political participation is dangerous. Alexis 
de Tocqueville (1955) observed that when the centralised French state 
reduced local autonomy and inhibited institutional participation, resul-
tant confrontations were violent and led to chaos and disorder. This 
historical lesson seems to be relevant to today's China. In order to pre-
vent large-scale violent events from occurring and to direct all rural so-
cial protests into an institutionalised area within villages, the Chinese 
state has promoted and encouraged the establishing of village demo-
cratic institutions such as village elections and village representative as-
semblies. The Chinese government granted village committees the sta-
tus of 'mass organisations' which are able to control village affairs 
through village autonomy. It also encouraged the development of lim-
ited local democratic institutions in order to avoid social trouble and re-
duce social conflicts. Rather than demonstrating on the streets or in 
pllblic places, villagers are 'seduced' into fighting for their interests 
I hrough village representative assemblies or elections; any potential ra-
(liea l social movement, therefore, can be turned into a constructive 
I{Hee to build an orderly society in rural China. Social protests thus 
COJlstitute an essential process of state building and an instrument in 
the art of governance. In addition, the relationship between the state 
il J](.1 rural society has been reconstructed in such a way that social pro-
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tests have exercised great pressure on the state, and villagers through 
their social protests and limited collective actions have been able to ne-
gotiate with the agencies of the state at local levels. 
State building and the rural policies concerning rural order and vil-
lage autonomy have provided social protesters with 'an opportunity 
structure' , a tenn coined by Sidney Tarrow (I994). Drawing on the 
State's Organic Law, villagers have carried out what Kevin O'Brien 
(I996) calls 'rightful resistance'. Social protests as a fonn of political 
participation are a driving force in making formal village democratic 
institutions meaningful and in improving the existing democratic insti-
tutions. When villagers are given an opportunity to exert control over 
their lives through self-governing institutions, their participation in vil-
lage affairs is a central determinant of whether these institut ions can 
actually work. Indeed , it is only through the political participation of 
villagers that formal institutions. which exist on paper, can be trans-
formed into genuine democratic institutions .. Tt is through rrightful re-
sistance' - a form of participation where villagers use official policies 
and state iaws to confront local leaders (O"Brien & Li 1996) - that s.o-
called 'cosmetic' village elections can be transfonned into meaningful 
village democracy (Kennedy 2..0 0 2). 
This chapter studies social protests and their impact on key institu-
tions of village democra<.:y su ch as electoral mI,e, yillage citizenship, 
and village representative assembly. It focuses on the political impact 
of social protests, addressing the essential question of how disruptive 
social events can be turned into a positive constructiv force. My ap-
proach is different from that of Lianjiang Li and Kevin O'Brien (.2 .002 ) 
who study poli tical attitudes and behaviour in choosing different forms 
of collective actions, a·nd examines how village elections bring village 
committee members and villagers together in resisting unlawful local 
policies {Li 20.01). 
The chapter draws on ten years of research, conducted betwee11 1993 
and 2.003. which bas enabled me to track arious trend and develop-
ments in the implementation of village elections and the rise of village 
democracy. Offidal controls on the information about sodal protests 
make it very difficult to get reliable statistical data on lural sodal pro-
test The chapter presents anecdotal d.at.a on the situation in particular 
villages. While it is not easy to discuss how widespread the phenomen-
on is likely to be, the story described in the cha.pter indica es a new 
trend which is significant for the democratisation of rural China. 
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Rural Social Protests 
According to one study conducted by Professor rae Ho Chung of Seoul 
National University, collective public security incidents (CoPS I, quan-
tixing zhian shijian) - incidents whereby groups of people gather to dis-
rupt public order and destroy public properties - have been increasing 
annually, from 8,7°0 in 1993 to II,OOO in 1995, 15,000 in 1997, 
32,000 in 1999, and 40,000 in 2004 (Jae 2004). In my fieldwork I of-
ten encounter demonstrations and villagers' visits to towns or town-
ships to complain about corrupt village leaders. In December 2004 in 
front of the official building at one township in Wenglin, Zhejiang, 
more than three hundred villagers gathered to read aloud collectively 
the Organic Law's provision that any major decision with regard to 
land and village welfare must be discussed by and passed through the 
village representative assembly. They were protesting against one ex-
ploitative developer who had bribed a few local officials for cheap land, 
and against corrupt officials who had appropriated village lands with-
out gaining consent from the village representative assembly.2 In Han-
yuan, YaAn, in 2004, hundreds of villagers protested against a reloca-
tion plan to such an extent that the government had to send the mili-
tary to crush the public demonstration. 
The issues concerning rural protesters are villagers' rights, the mis-
appropriation of collective land, the collection of illegal fees, corruption 
and the misuse of public funds. Rural social protests express the fol-
lowing values: rights-based morality, personal autonomy, and a clear 
and accountable local government, as opposed to centralised control 
and bureaucratisation. The fonns taken by social protests and collective 
action include the mobilisation of villagers to launch complaints, pub-
lic appeals, demonstrations, actions against manipulated elections, the 
collection of signatures to submit a dismissal proposal, and many 
others. The social bases of rural protests are village kinships, factions, 
and even elected village committees or village representative assem-
blies. Increasingly, villagers appeal to elected village committees who 
organise collective protest complaints against excessive fees extracted 
by township leaders (U 2001: 2). 
Rural social protests can be understood as a diverse and multi-
layered critique of the Chinese authoritarian system. Villagers are 
struggling against the exploitation and corruption of local govern-
ments. It can also be explained partly as a result of the inadequacies of 
the existing market system. In facing an unequal distribution of wealth 
created by the market economy, the most disadvantaged groups have to 
organise themselves to fight for their interests and rights. 
In addition, it can be seen to be a result of the transformation of rur-
al society in the age of modernisation. In traditional and communist 
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Chinese rural societies, the purpose of individuals is seen as contribut-
ing to the good of society. Indeed, the very existence of individuals is be-
lieved to rely on society, and the way of thinking and behaviour of indi-
viduals are said to be defined by society. Society, with its hierarchy and 
customs, is understood as a great source of the individuals' values and 
beliefs. It is a safe haven which offers individuals a sense of belonging. 
With the marketisation of the Chinese economy, Chinese rural society 
has been commercialised and individualised in the sense that rural in-
dividuals care about and pursue their self-interest. The individualisa-
tion and atomisation of Chinese society have been accompanied by in-
creasing collective actions and social protests. Indeed, social protests 
and social movements can be seen as an instrumental tool whereby in-
dividuals can maximise their individual liberty and secure their indivi-
dual rights. In facing ruthless markets and corrupt governments, a sin-
gle individual is powerless and carries no weight at all. Individuals 
have to organise themselves, either by forming various associations or 
launching social protests. 
Social protests and collective actions give the individual bargaining 
powers and a sense of social solidarity. Under the pressure of maintain-
ing order and stability, local officials sometimes meet the demand 
made by social protesters. In subsequent sections, we will see how rur-
al social protests have pressured the state as well as local governments 
into developing a system of village citizenship, improving electoral pro-
cedures, establishing a recall procedure, introducing competitive elec-
tions, and institutionalising the village representative assemblies. Of 
course, not all social protests lead to village democracy) I personally 
encountered a professional protester in Beijing in May 2005, who went 
to the capital city five times from a remote village in Hunan Province 
to launch his petition to get a fair deal on the appropriation of village 
land, but was beaten and arrested by local policemen several times, 
with the issue concerning the village land still unresolved, and there 
has still been no village representative meeting to address the common 
land issue in his village.4 
Fighting for Village Citizenship5 
Merle Goldman (2002) highlights the importance of citizens' initiative 
and struggle in the post-Mao era, by individuals and groups asserting 
their political rights, rather than waiting for them to be granted by the 
government. Indeed, it is through struggle that villagers now defend 
their village citizenship. 
The following examples highlight key aspects of struggles for demo-
cratic village citizenship: 
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- Retired cadres, who were members of a village and who had house-
hold registration in a city but who are now living in their home vil-
lage, demand the right to vote. 
- Those who have gained household registration in cities, after their 
collective lands were appropriated by the government or other agen-
cies in the cities, demand their original villager status and their 
right to vote. 
- Married-out women demand their right to vote in many townships, 
as they attempt to retain their household registration in their native 
village and refuse to acquiesce to the village leaders' demand that 
they should re-register their household in their husbands' villages. 
One woman, who did not have proper marriage registration and 
was therefore deprived of her right to vote, demanded its restora-
tion. 
- Migrant workers demand their right to vote in the village where 
they have worked for a long period. 
- Ordinary villagers demand the right to vote. During the 1998 vil-
lage election in Tianli, Huiping township, votes from one house-
hold were somehow left uncounted. Though the electoral working 
team tried to convince the family that it was due to a technical mis-
take, the family was very angry. They went all the way to the town-
ship leaders to protest against 'being unlawfully deprived of voting 
rights'. The leaders had to apologise profusely before the family'S 
anger was appeased. 
- Those who were deprived of their right to vote, due to their breach 
of state laws under the one-child policy, have fought for their right 
to vote and the right to run for election. 
- Ordinary villagers demand the right to run for election. Zhang Yu-
bin, who was deprived of his right to vote by township leaders, ap-
pealed to a local court and won back his right to contest the village 
election in 1998 (Ding 1999: 32-34). 
Even family members whose parents died in the wake of the vil-
lage'S first round of elections argue that their parents should have 
the right to vote in the second round of elections (Wei 2001: 65). 
Villagers are fighting to realise their political, social and economic 
rights and to force local cadres to respect and honour these rights. 
They equally defend their rights against the misuse of power by village 
cadres. For example, a widow defended her right to inherit the proper-
ties of her husband against the village leaders' decision that the proper-
ties should go to her son. An ordinary villager who was contracted to 
run a village enterprise defended his right against the decision of the 
village committee to end the contract before the term expired. 
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Migrant workers are fighting for village citizenship. In some villages, 
the decision whether or not to grant village membership to a migrant 
is made in village meetings on a case-by-case basis. Some village com-
mittees respect and guard the legal rights of migrants in the running 
of their business and consult them when migrant affairs are involved. 
In village enterprises, nrigrant workers participate in management 
through their representatives. [n Beicun, Wuyan township the local 
population is outnumbered by migrants. Taking this fact into .account, 
the village has set up a system of multi-level consultations with the 
aim of collectin:g opinions from various groups; incluCling migrant 
workers and business people in the village. 
Women are fighting for their rights. In ZhejiangJ married-out wo-
men in rich villages desire to retain village status in their home villages 
and refuse to register in their husbands' residential area. These mar-
ried-out women are frequently denied their right to vote and entitle-
ment to economic benefits by village assembly or village representative 
assemblies, which act democratically but in authoritarian fashion 
against these" w.omens interests. n Zhejiang several villages [ visited 
held village representative assembly meetings to decide the tough ques-
tion of whether these women should retain their status. The decision 
was often made that if a woman marries out, she loses her village citi-
zenship. In one village in Wenzou, even if a divorced woman returns 
to her home village and is registered there, she is still denied the right 
to vote.6 Only those who marry in are enti.tled to village status. 
Twenty-two women in Simen Village at Anyang township demanded 
the economic right to village wealth. Their request was denied by the 
village representative assembly. They appealed to county leaders who 
did not want to take any responsibility and only requested the village 
representative assembly to reconsider the case. The women alsoap-
proached the local newspaper to publish their stories. Finally, they 
went to the local court, which decided that the question of village status 
is a matter of village autonomy and should only be decided by the vil-
lage representative assembly? In 2002·~ however,. in Shua.ngqiao village, 
it was decided that a married-out woman can retain her right to vote 
within one year of her marriage. In Guangdong. a few women chal-
lenged such a decision through judicial appeal and won the case. The 
local court in that instance decreed that the village assembly had no 
right to make a decision that denies women their political rights, which 
are protected by national law. 
Minority groups are also struggling for their village rights. Village 
citizenship has the normative requirement that demands equal treat-
ment within a village. The citizens ofavillage ha.ve the right to share 
equally in a· portion of village wealth. In turn. the differentiated treat-
ment sometimes imposed by the majority of villagers upon a minority 
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challenges thi fundamental aspect of village citizenship. I will now ex-
amine a detailed case to illustrate this theme. 
Jianshe village in Wuyun township in Lishun city has a population 
of 872 (400 are male. 472 female) and consists of six village te<nn.s .. [t 
has 171 rou of land, of which 109 mu are to be contracted to the villa-
gers during the new contract period, and 62 mu are managed by the 
village committee. In 2000 the total income of the village was 
625000 yuan, and total expenses 697000 yuan. Its annual average 
per capita income ' 3,366 yuan. 
On 18 August 1999, th first village representative assembly was 
held to discuss the new contrad. The task was completed on 18 March 
2000 I taking seven months_ The proposal that the first contract, with a 
few modifications, be continued for another 30 yeus was passed with 
the support of 72.7 per cent of votes in the second village representa-
tive assembly. 
A dispute occurred during the process. The key issue was whether 
the fifth team should be treated equally. Historically, the fifth team was 
amalgamated into Jianshe village in 1958 by an administrative order. 
Geographically it is located on the top of a mountainl far away from 
the rest of the village and the site .ofWuyun. township. so that its lands 
hay Ji Ie commercial value and contribute little to the collective 
wealth .of the village. For these reasons, the other five village teams de-
manded that the fifth team m.aintain their old contract and that it 
should not enjoy the same benefits as all other village teams. While 
the villagers of all other flv teams are given the amount of money 
equal to 12.5 kilogram. rice, the fifth team is denied this bene-fit. 
Subsequently,. village representative meetings were held ten times. 
Each time the fUth team lost its appeal because its four village repre-
sentatives were outnumbered among the 36 representatives. It then ap-
pealed to the township authority and local n wspaper and held a pub-
lic rally. In the end, through compromise and persuasion inside and 
outside village representative meetings, a deal was reached. While the 
villageIs of the fifth team are entitled to mo t of the benefits, a differ-
entiat d policy towards contracting and village welfare provision was 
also adopted. 
In this case, the :fifth team demanded a fair share of collective bene--
fits . Basic village citizenship and the right to appeaJ enabled the minor-
ity group to defend its rights and interests. This case reveals that vil-
lage democracy is ma.king progress and that compromises can be 
made, a balance struck and relative fairness achieved. Despite the 
dominance of maj.orities, village assemblies provide forums in which 
minority groups can express their needs and dissatisfactions., and ulti~ 
mately reach accommodations. 
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In conclusion, villagers' willingness to fight for status and the right 
to vote signals a broad trend towards development from peasants to ci-
tizens. It might be argued that village democratic institutions have 
turned peasants into modem citizens, as villagers empower themselves 
by using democratic institutions and. procedures to defend their inter-
ests. They are simultaneously active in establishing, consolidating and 
entrenching the democratic institutions of the village assembly or vil-
lage representative assembly. The increasing importance of village citi-
zenship is changing the local political culture and establishing a rights-
based political morality. In such a context, we should use the term of 
'villager' seriously and give up the older term of 'peasant', which seems 
inadequate to describe people, at least in the area I have visited, if not 
in the whole of rural China. 
Procedures 
Through various forms of protest, villagers have resisted manipulated 
elections and demanded fair and free elections. They have resisted elec-
tion procedures they consider unfair, irregular or corrupt by refusing to 
pay tax. Such resistance has forced the state to adopt and promote open 
and transparent procedures, in particular, the state has endorsed hai-
xuan (naming from the floor or direct nomination for candidates) to re-
solve practical problems. 
My earlier field trips found that party secretaries appointed candi-
dates in the earlier village elections in Zhejiang. In Jiangxia village of 
Chengguan township. village cadres decided their candidates through 
negotiati.on amongst themselves. Beizhang. Pukou and Cangyan town-
ships ea.ch ha.d one village where the candidates were secretly decided. 
Such a practice waS justified by one offidal in the Ministry of Civic Af~ 
fairs in 1994 as normal since party leaders decide candidates in all 
elections in China.8 In 1994, Wang Yongfei, an officia1 from the De-
partment of Civic Affairs in Zhejiang, stated that villagers did not have 
the time and knowledge for complex procedures, so the nonnal prac-
tice was that the party secretary or party branch would decide on the 
candidates. He also argued that it was too costly for villagers to take 
more than twenty days and to run four or five preliminary elections to 
choose the candidates in one village in Jinghua.9 
The appointment of candidates by party secretaries, however, faced 
resistance from villagers who did not vote for the official nominated 
candidates. Sometimes official nominated candidates lost elections, 
sometimes elections failed to produce any village leader, thus leading 
to a vacuum in village governance. To overcome this practical problem, 
some villages experimented with direct nomination by villagers, and 
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township leaders had to make a compromise in letting villagers nomi-
nate candidates. 
In the process of resisting manipulated elections, villagers invented 
and practiced haixuan, which originated in Lishu county. Jilin province 
(Jing 1999; China Association of Study ofGIass-root lnstitutions & Re-
search Team for Project of Chinese Village Autonomy 1994). In one 
village. 571 out of 693 eligible voters took part in haixuan. (Chan f998: 
5II). Haixuan was quickly adopted in the Xiangtan and Suining coun-
ties of Hunan province as well as five counties and two districts in 
Gansu province.. This was a small minority in national terms (Ma 
2003: 5). Haixuan was ultimately endorsed in the 1998 Organic Law. 
Artide 14 s'tipulates. 'In village elections, candidates should be nomi-
nated directly by the eligible voters of the village, with the number of 
candidates exceeding the number of positions available. , 10 
Recall 
Elected village leaders might misuse power and/or fail to keep prom-
ises made in election campaigns. They might be incompetent or unac-
countable or irresponsible. Villagers have collected signatures, sub-
mitted petitions, put forward motions, gone to local official offices or 
media institutions, and even marched in the streets to demand the re-
moval of some incompetent and corrupt village leaders. Villagers' 
struggles have improved the recall procedure and made it work in 
some cases. 
The 1987 provisional Organic Law made a very general and vague 
reference to the issue of recalling. Article II merely stipulates, 'the vil-
lagers' assembly has the right to recall. village committee members or 
call for by-elections to elect new members· (The Division of Local Gov-
ernments, The Ministry of Civic Affairs 1994: 4). It was insufficient to 
simply have a law that grants voters the right to recall the elected offi-
cial but that does not layout a procedure for doing so. In 'the face of 
protests and demands for recalling. the national government bas had 
to revise the 1987 Organic law. Specific dismissal terms ultimately 
were written in the 1998 Organic Law. Artide 16 of which states: 
( ... ) a proposal of dismissal of committee members is valid when 
it is put forward and signed by 20 per cent or mo.re of eligible 
voters in the village. Reasons must be give.n for the dislnissal. 
The members involved have the right to defend themselves. The 
village committee should in due time convene a meeting of villa-
gers to vote on the proposal, which takes 50 per cent or more of 
votes for a pass. II 
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According to the Organic Law, the dismissal should be handled by the 
village committee. The several cases we have at hand indicate that the 
village committee may be unwilling to carry out the process, in particu-
lar if the dismissal involves the village head. To solve this concrete pro-
blem, Article 27 of the Regulations of Village Election of Zhejiang, 
passed by the 16th session of the 9th Provincial People's Congress, 
stipulates: 
A proposal to dismiss a committee member is valid when it is 
put forward and signed by 20 per cent or more of eligible voters 
in the village. The proposal should be submitted to the village 
committee in written form with reasons given for the dismissal. 
Copies of the proposal should be sent to township governments 
as records. Upon receiving the proposal, the village committee 
should convene a meeting of villagers to vote on the proposal no 
later than within a month. Meanwhile, the sponsors of the dis-
missal should have their representatives state their reasons at 
the meeting. Committee members involved in the dismissal pro-
posal have the right to defend themselves. It takes So per cent 
or more of votes to pass the proposal, and the result should be 
reported to the township government. If the village committee 
does not convene a meeting 30 days after it has received the pro-
posal, the township government should intervene and help to 
hold the meeting of villagers. 12 
I t is apparent from this regulation that township governments have an 
important role to play in the recalling of committee members. Town-
ship intervention has proved invariably to be crucial in the dismissal of 
the village chiefs of Xikouwang, Bailian and Jile villages. 
Since the promulgation of the new law, there have been quite a lot 
of dismissal cases. Almost all motions of dismissal are triggered by cor-
ruption in village affairs.13 In Yiwu county, 305 village leaders were dis-
missed through village representative meetings in 2000.]4 Below is a 
case of the dismissal in the village of Bailian in Pandai township (Zhou 
1999: 2). I describe this case in detail to elaborate on the detailed pro-
cedures and the whole process. 
1. To put forward a proposal of dismissal. Because of an 'irregular deal' 
that involved the selling of a hundred mu of land and 'mismanage-
ment of economic affairs' by the village committee, tension built up 
between villagers and the village committee in Hailian. On 13 No-
vember 1998, 451 villagers signed a motion to dismiss He Guang-
shou from his post of village head. The motion was directed to the 
leadership above. 
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2. ApprovaL. On 29 March 1999, the township government sent its re-
presentatives to check the signatures on the dismissal m.otion and 
found that those who had signed amounted to over one-fifth of the 
total number of voters in the village. The next day, the deputy town-
ship head came to the village to announce the start of the dismissal 
procedure. 
3. Villager representativesJ meeting ,chaired by township government and 
thi: making of rule. 0 April 6, the township government held a 
meeting of ten village representatives, during which the Procedur s 
of Voting on the Dismissal of Village Head in Bailian were passed. 
4. Villagers' meeting and tIle hearing of charges. On 9 April, a villagers' 
meeting was held at Bailian Primazy Schpol, during which the 
township head Ding Shichun asked the villagers to speak truthfully 
and vote prudently·. Then Li Jiankai. a member of the supervisory 
group of village fmance, listed reasons for the dismissaL 
5. The village head defending himself. As stipulated in the Organic Law 
of Village Committee. 'village committee members who are facing 
dismissal charges have the right to defend themselves'. Accordingly 
He Guangshou presented a different story on the issues of finance 
and the land deaL 
6. Voting. At the conclusion of the villagers' meeting, voting took 
place. The result was that 413 votes were for the dismis at 248 
against it, and 3 abstained. On. the afternoon of '9 April, township 
head Ding Shi<;hun announced that the dismissal proposal was 
passed on the basis of the 664 votes collected out of a total of 666. 
I must point out, however, that m.any villages, for one reason or an-
Odlet, have difficulty in convening a m.eeting of all villagers. The voters 
of Baoziying village in Hebei province for example, were not so .suc-
cessful in their bid to recall their committee. Incensed by corruption, 
heavy taxes and a number of other problems, the villagers took the in-
itiative and held a meeting on n December 1998 to vote on the motion 
to dismiss the village cornnrittee. Over 100 representatives took a peti-
tion to Shijiazhuang, Hebei's provincial capital. but they were blocked 
on their way by the police_ Zhao Zengbing, Wang tiying Fan Zhengjie, 
Zhao Ujun, Liu Yanfangand other young villagers were detained on 23 
December 1998. and later arrested 'on charges of 'disturbing social or-
der' and 'mterfering with offidal business'. i5 
Competitive Elections 16 
Before examining competitive elections, I would like to briefly discuss 
two types of non-competitive elections. The ftrst genre is muddled elec-
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tions in which electors lack information about electoral procedures, 
and township and village leaders conduct elections without following a 
set of electoral procedures. These muddled elections are nothing more 
than a formality. 
The second genre is manipulated elections in which village party sec-
retaries manipulate electoral procedures, select their own favoured can-
didates, and pre-determine the result of elections. Prior to these elec-
tions, electors already know who will win, and elections lack uncer-
tainty and excitement. 17 These manipulated elections take place in 
authoritarian villages where competitiveness is absent and popular par-
ticipation is low (O'Brien 1994: 54) . 
Both muddled and manipulated elections tend to invite the villagers' 
criticism, scepticism and resistance, and contribute little to good village 
governance. During the village elections in September 1999 in Sheng-
zhou. the city received over 1.900 telephone calls. letters and personal 
visits. Approximately ten per cent of the calls, letters and visits sought 
election information, sixty per cent complained about violations of reg-
ulations by electorate staff and Party secretaries, twenty per cent the 
violations of the Organic Laws by election staff, and ten per cent finan-
cial mismanagement. Petitioners demanded that action be taken before 
elections could continue (Qiu 1999). Villagers adopted various mea-
sures against these forms of elections, such as non-participation, ap-
peal to upper levels, or nomination of their own candidates. Through 
villagers' constant struggles. semi-competitive or full competitive elec-
tions have been gradually tolerated and adopted by the state. 
Elections to positions on village committees have become increas-
ingly competitive since they were introduced over ten years ago. The 
1998 election was particularly competitive. The practice of direct and 
open elections, called haixuan (direct elections) in many localities, has 
dramatically increased the competitiveness of the village elections. One 
indication of this was the gap between the number of candidates and 
that of open positions: there were many more candidates than posi-
tions. Between April and July 1999. 786 villages in the Yuyao munici-
pality held elections under the 'Organic Law of Village Committee'. 
The ratio of candidates to positions was 48:1, which was unprecedented 
in the history of village election.18 In Laofangqiao, a township selected 
by the Yuyao municipality for test elections, the villagers nominated 
959 candidates for the 57 open seats. The candidate-seat ratio was ITI, 
promising intense competition.I9 
Competition was also intensified as elections shifted from 'one-can-
didate' elections, which dominated in 1994, to 'multiple-candidates' 
elections, which dominated in 1998-1999. In Linhai, for example, the 
number of candidates in 1995 was generally the same as the number 
of positions. In 1998-1999, however, multiple candidates were nomi-
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nated for the position of village bead.20 In 19951 the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs assessed the degree to which elections across the country met 
three criteria: competitive dectoral pracessJ public campaigning, and 
secret ballots. Judged by these criteria, Zhejiang was behind Fuj'ian. 
Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Jilin. Hunan, Henan, Sichuan, and other prov-
inces (Howe111998~ 96). Take the Tongxiang municipality ofZhejiang 
as an example. In late 1992. the then-Tongxjang county held its second 
round of village elections. of its 306 villages, 244 (86.9 per cent) took 
the. non.-competitiveapproach: the same number of candidates for the 
same number of positions. OniY40 villages (13.J per c.ent) held semi· 
competitive elections. By I998, however, as Zhang Biao has found in 
his case shldy of the elections in the 10 administrative villages ·of 
Taoyuan township in July of that year. competitive elections were COID-
mono Quite a large number of villagers nominated themselves as can· 
didates for village committee positions. As the township government 
made no effort to limit the nwn~r of candidates. elections became 
very competitive "Zhang~ 1998). 
The competitiveness of dec.tions is also related to the Dominating 
procedures and the number of candidates. The intensity of competition 
very much depends on how candidates are nominated, how many can 
be nominated~ and whether the number of candidates· is larger than 
the number of posts. In past elections in Liuzheng township (~ndi· 
dates were chosen by the village branch of the CCP and were approved 
by the township party committee and government leadership before 
they were introduced to the voters. Voters actually had no right or op-
portunity to nominate candidates. In addition in the case of elections 
for village heads, it was official policy to limit the elections to one can-
didate for one position. Thus, competition was simply not expected. 
Township leaders, out of concern. for either ern.ployment or vested in-
terests, would have a hand in the nomination processJ particularly the 
nomination of the village head. Sometimes they even manipulated the 
nominations, ruling out the possibility of real competition. 
One major difference between the'Ozgank law of Village Commit· 
tee' of 1998 and its 1987 predecessm: is that the new law stipulates that 
the village committee should be directly elected ·by the vijJagers. After 
the April 1999 election 'n laofangqiao township. we interviewed a 
number of viHagers d asked them to compar the rec,ent election 
with past ones. During the past ,elections .. they said,th candida.tes 
were aU band-picked by the leadership above. The number of candi-
dates was xa.ctly the same as the number of positions open to e ection. 
As a result, villagers did not think: much of the election, because thejr 
will was ignored, and all they were expected to do was draw a yes·circle 
aroun.d the names of the anointed candidates.2.1 How ver nominating 
procedures in the new elections, such as haixuan, involve and encour-
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age much competition. In such cases, the authorities do not try to con-
trol or dominate the nominating procedure. Instead, they allow the vil-
lagers to exercise their rights and nominate the candidates of their 
choice. 
The Establishment and Improvement of the VRA 
Village representative assemblies (VRA) were designed to elicit people's 
support for local projects or voice their opinions. Concerned with a fair 
distribution of village wealth.. many villagers demand the regular and 
frequent holding of these assemblies. In this way political participation 
becomes nleaningful, and villagers empower themselves by using for-
mal democratic . nstitutions to minimise corruption and to demand a 
fair distribution of village wealth. 
As early as I991, Li Qiaobai, the head of party organisation in Li 
Shui prefecture. advocated and promoted the VRA. However, many 
township and village leaders disclosed to me in my interview their re-
servatian as to the multi-function of the VRA. TIley would cite the fol· 
lowing cases in which the VRA could do little to. solve a problem: 
1. If a resalutian passed by the VRA could not come into effect, help 
fram township leaders would be indispensable for its implementa-
tion. 
2. If a pre-made village decisian proved to be inappropriate and 
needed some change, it wauld be up to. the party committee and vil-
lage committee to make the change. 
3. The effectiveness of the VRA would be seriously impaired when 
some representatives express radical views ar hold meetings with-
out getting cansent. 
4. When the head of a village committee proved incompetent, slhe 
would need help from a stay-in-village cadre with functions such as 
chairing a meeting.22 
VRAs were established anly in a limited number of villages. It was not 
until 1998 that Wuyun township in Li Shui prefecture embarked on a 
trial stage in seven of its villages. When we conducted interviews in 
1997-1998. most villagers there knew very little about the system. Only 
in some model village did the VRA playa full role and. was appreciated 
by both representatives and villagers. 
While the national law does not specify the timing and number of 
the village representative meetings~ the pravincial regulations of Zhe· 
jiang stipula ed that it: should be held at least once a yeaL The timing 
and the number of the meetings vary in different areas. Diyiqiao v' . age 
was said to hald at least two meetings each year, in July and Navember. 
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Xiacun village also had two meetings, but the time was March and Sep-
tember. Laiwang village had four meetings each year, presided over by 
the village committee. These figures are consistent with Oi and Rozel-
le's survey in 1995 which found that the average number is 2.76 VRA 
meetings a year (Oi & Rozelle 2000). Local officials in Tangxiang toWn-
ship argued against frequent meetings of VRAs, contending that they 
gave too much power to village representatives, who would feel the im-
portance of their positions but whose different views would make it dif-
firult to reach a condusion.2 } Similarly, the party secretary. Zen He-
ping, in Tuanjie village in Hongshang district in Wuhan, insisted that 
the proposal about the privatisation of village enterprises not be dis-
cussed in the VRA, citing as a reason that the representatives are not 
able to make a good decision when interests are involved.24 By con-
trast, in Beiwang village, 'the VRA is particularly active, meeting on 
the third day of every month' (Lawrence 1994: 64). 
According to a survey by Yang Min, 57.8 per cent respondents in 
1990 and 73.3 per cent in 1996 confirmed that they participated in 
VRAs only 1-2 times a year. Some 32.7 per cent and 20.7 per cent parti-
cipated several times a year (Yang 2000). In Kent Jennings's survey, 47 
percent of the respondents reported that they went to all-village meet-
ings (Jennings 1997: 363), and David Zweig's fieldwork revealed that 
16.4 percent of the 3,078 respondents looked to the village assembly if 
village cadres carry out unfair policies (Zweig 2002a: 44). 
The decision made through VRAs tends to gain legitimacy, face less 
resistance and be implemented more easily, while decisions, for exam-
ple, on village land, made by village leaders alone without going 
through VRAs often invite criticism and protest. Realising the value of 
VRAs' contribution to maintaining social order and containing social 
conflicts, the state has actively called for the institutionalisation of 
VRAs. Starting in 2000, VRAs became more active in Zhejiang prov-
ince. For example, Jianshe village held more than ten representative 
meetings to decide the tough question of how to carry out the second 
round of contracting collective land in Wuyun township. Increasingly, 
more and more villagers are using VRAs to challenge village leaders. 
For example, one village chief in Yuhuan county signed a contract with 
a factory without consulting with the representatives of the VRA in 
2000. Some representatives sued the village chief in the local court for 
violating the 1998 Organic Law, and they won the case. Such a success-
ful story inspired many villagers who went to local courts to sue their 
village chiefs who failed to consult with VRAs when they made various 
decisions. 
Liaodong village in Wenzhou municipality, Zhejiang, is another ex-
ample of VRAs taking an important role in governance. On 24 May 
1999, a villagers' meeting was held to vote on a motion of dismissal. 
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The result was that 87 per cent of the people voted yes for the dismis-
sal of Pan Hongchong as village head, who three years ago was voted 
into office with a large majority. Pan was charged with, among other 
things, abuse of power and mismanagement of village affairs. As the 
check of village accounts revealed, during Pan's three years in office, he 
and others had squandered 660,000 yuan or one-fourth of the village 
income for their social entertainment. 25 
In recent years, village leaders, recognising the importance of the 
VRAs, are more frequently using the meeting in their decision-making 
process. One such example is Shuangqiao village in Chengjiao town-
ship of Wenzhou. Believing it would payoff in the long run, the village 
leaders bought a 4-storeyed office building from a business company 
at 8 million RMB. However, since the deal was made without any con-
sultation in advance with the village representative meeting, some 
villagers grew angry and suspicious. They challenged village leaders 
and demanded a say in the decision-making process, and they went to 
the leadership above to voice their anger and suspicion, which did not 
die down until half a year later. Drawing from this incident, the village 
committee began to pay more attention to the views of the representa-
tive meeting. Consequently, in the latter half of the year 2000 alone, as 
many as ten meetings were held. A record of these ten meetings shows 
the topics of the meetings. According to Bai Gang and Zhao Shuo-
xing's survey study, 21 percent of the respondents out of 34 village lea-
ders confirmed that VRAs have made final decisions on major village 
affairs in Lishu county, Jilin province; 82.27 out of 51 in Hequ county 
in Shanxi province; and 14.99 out of 101 in Lunan county in Yunan 
province (Bai & Zhao 2001). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the role of social protests led by ordinary 
villagers in promoting village democracy.26 The' opposition between the 
interest of ordinary villag,ers and the vested interests of ,cadtes are driv· 
ing forces for village democracy. This gives rise to an unstable and con· 
flictive circumstance in which elections and village democracy are em-
ployed by the state as a mechanism to ease these tensions. In particu-
lar, the institution of village representative assembly has been 
developed and improved to deal with structural conflicts of interests. 
Village democracy provides a mechanism whereby the state can co-
opt the new rich into the system in order to prevent them from becom-
ing a disruptive for,ce. It is regarded by the state as a check system in 
which villagers can use the VRA to express their views, while village 
chiefs can use village committees as a counterbalance to the power of 
SOCIAL PROTESTS, VILLAGE DEMOCRACY AND STATE BUILDING IN CHINA 41 
Table 2.1 Agenda o!Vif(ager Representative Meetings, Shuangqiao Vif/age Uunt: to 
December 2000) 
Meeting Date Agenda and Action 
8 June Discussing and passing the bill to turn the parking lot in the 
village into a household electronics market. 
2 20 June Discussing and passing the bill on welfare distribution on a 
household base. 
3 27 July Discussing and passing the bill to raise the seniors' pension from 
the current monthly 70-80 to 200 RMB. 
4 31 July Discussing and passing the bill that a woman is no longer eligible 
for village benefits once she gets married and lives away from the 
village. 
S 4 August Deciding to get a lawyer to sue on the fa lse report by the Zhejiang 
Daily Legal Report. 
6 24 August Discussing and deciding to settle the contract dispute between 
the village and the packing machinery factory through legal 
means. 
7 16 November Rallying support (or the construction of the electronics market. 
8 29 November Further discussion and passing of the bill to settle the contract 
dispute between the village a.lildtlle pa,cking machinery factory 
through legal means, despite opposition from the township 
leadership. 
9 7 December Most representatives stick to the resolution of the previous 
meeting. 
10 20 December Discussing and deciding to reject the shares of one company. 
The rejection was partly the result of the villagers' dissatisfaction 
with the deal. 
Sources: A Chronicle of Village Meetings in Shuangqiao 
the party secretary. Electoral institutions empower elected village chiefs 
and committee members. Village committees and representative as-
sem.blies in tum restrict the behaviour of village party secretaries. 
Village democracy is now seen as an integral part of state building 
in rural China. The state has discovered that the benefits of village de-
mocracy outweigh its costs and that it helps to reduce conflict and pro-
mote stability .. Township leaders were ,originally opposed to village elec-
tions that removed their power to appoint village leaders. But through 
the process of village elections, they found that VMs can assist them 
in solving controversial questions about village membership. Further-
more, hUOOlan saves their energy and time by reducing conflict. Of 
equal importance, they discovered that democratic means can be used 
to regain their control over village leaders. For example. they even en-
courage electoral rivalry within a village so that competing factions will 
seek help from the township. Often they are able to use VRAs to dis-
ntiss village leaders whom they do not like. Most importantly, local offi-
cials find that 'village democratic institutions such as public consulta-
tion and the VRAs can help to avoid and reduce social troubles and vil-
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lagers' protests'. 27 Fang Lizhi, the famous Chinese dissident, is right to 
claim that democracy is not bestowed as a gift, rather that it is fought 
for by the people themselves (Fang 1987). Villager participation that 
takes the form of protest and appeal, collective action, and the mobili-
sation of village factions and kinship is what transforms fonnal institu-
tions, which may exist on paper, into fully functioning ones. 
The above Chinese story of social protesters and village democracy is 
a testament to the life project of Alain Touraine, a French thinker and 
renowned sociologist, who devoted his life to a study of democratic ac-
tion through new social movements (Touraine 1985). According to 
Touraine, it is only through participating in social movements that in-
dividuals can recover their liberty diminished by the neoliberal state 
and markets (Touraine 1995). For him, the ideas of democracy have 
three basic elements: (I) basic rights, (2) citizenship, and (3) represen-
tativity (Touraine 1997). Indeed, in the case of village elections, some 
social protests have fought in these three areas through social protest 
and some villagers are struggling to assert what Touraine terms 'the 
autonomy of the human subject' in controlling village affairs. 
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